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1The welfare of societies depends increasingly oneffective access to knowledge—on capacitiesboth to innovate and to enjoy the benefits of
innovation.  Differences in these capacities have become
a major differentiator of rich and poor, and a fault line
in efforts to build a more equitable process of globaliza-
tion.  Since its founding in 1913, the Rockefeller
Foundation has been involved in both sides of this equa-
tion—innovation and access—as it works to bring
knowledge to bear on the root causes of poverty.
Investments in medical research, new crop varieties, and
other technologies and human capacities have targeted a
wide range of problems in public health, food security,
and human development.  These investments reflect a
commitment to expanding the ‘common wealth’ of
human knowledge, as a condition of fostering innova-
tion and extending its benefits to excluded groups.
The steady ‘privatization’ of knowledge in the past
three decades has cast doubt on the viability of this
strategy.  Media, information technology, and life sci-
ence companies, especially, have reshaped public policies
governing the ownership and use of their products.  The
emergence of new forms of knowledge—genes, databas-
es, digital formats, and research tools—has been accom-
panied by new and stronger claims of ownership, and by
new ways of defending those claims.  As knowledge of
all kinds becomes commoditized, the survival of a
shared ‘public’ knowledge commons has become increas-
ingly tenuous.  
Privatized knowledge systems alter the relation
between innovation and poverty in ways that are only
beginning to be analyzed and understood.  The most
important dynamic is also the simplest: a market-driven
system will systematically underserve those with low
purchasing power.  It will produce inequalities of access
to existing technologies and also in the responsiveness of
innovators to the needs of the poor.  Addressing this
dilemma is one of the major challenges of globalization,
with profound consequences for human welfare and
development.  Increasingly, it has become a debate
about the role and scope of intellectual property rights
(IPRs), which provide a framework for the ownership of
knowledge and ideas.  
In 2002, the Rockefeller Foundation launched a
grantmaking program to promote intellectual property
policies and institutional capacities that better served the
needs of the poor.  Longstanding Rockefeller concerns
with food security and public health figured prominent-
ly in this agenda, such as promoting research on neglect-
ed diseases and improving poor farmers’ access to plant
genetic resources.  New lines of work reflected growing
Rockefeller engagement with information technology
and digital rights, and rising concerns with process and
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2accountability in the global policy venues responsible for
the privatization of knowledge—the World Intellectual
Property Organization (WIPO) and the World Trade
Organization (WTO) especially. 
The ‘Bellagio Global Dialogues on Intellectual
Property’ were launched the same year to provide a strat-
egy forum for this larger agenda.  Over the next four
years, the Bellagio Center played host to fourteen con-
ferences, organized into distinct threads of inquiry on
health, access to plant genetic resources, trade and devel-
opment, systems of innovation, and the needs of indige-
nous peoples.  The conferences pursued a few key objec-
tives: policy analysis and advocacy; strategies for financ-
ing innovation and fostering access to knowledge; and
perhaps most importantly, interpersonal networking that
could advance a broad ‘pro-development’ agenda for
intellectual property policy.  
Held each fall, the Bellagio meetings became a gath-
ering place for critical IP expertise and a nascent pro-
development IP policy community.  It provided oppor-
tunities for researchers and advocates to engage country
delegates to WIPO and the WTO, officials from nation-
al health and trade ministries, scientists, entrepreneurs,
development partners and others in a spectrum running
from global policymaking to local challenges of access to
knowledge.  
This report is an account of the Bellagio conferences
and of their place within the larger arc of Rockefeller
intellectual property work since 2002.  In a more limit-
ed fashion, it is also an account of the transformation of
IP from an obscure legal specialty into a major discourse
of power and debate about the shape of globalization.
The broadest achievement of the Bellagio series—and of
Rockefeller Foundation work more generally in this
area—has been to make this debate more open, partici-
patory, and engaged with questions of poverty and
human development.  
The prospect of a uniform, enforceable, global regime of
laws for intellectual property is a recent one.  Until
recently, countries exercised considerable policy autono-
my in the areas of access to knowledge and incentives
for innovation.  Intellectual property policies in particu-
lar were tailored to support national policy objectives,
such as developing local technology sectors or facilitat-
ing access to medicines or educational materials.
Because of this autonomy, the global trade in knowledge
goods took place on an uneven playing field marked by
differences in patent criteria and copyright terms,
approaches to authors’ rights and reverse engineering,
degrees of IP enforcement, and—by the 1980s—diver-
gent approaches to the emerging fields of information
technology and biotechnology.  Although international
norms for IP protection were written into a variety of
international agreements, these were either voluntary or
lacked enforcement mechanisms.  
Pressure for an enforceable global IP regime began to
grow in the mid-1980s, in the context of debates about
the future World Trade Organization.  It came predomi-
nantly from trade officials and corporations based in the
richest economies—the E.U., Japan, Canada, and espe-
cially the U.S.—which derived a growing share of their
wealth from knowledge-intensive industries.  The global
IP regime took concrete shape with the passage of the
Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (or
TRIPS) agreement in 1994, which made participation
in the WTO dependent on compliance with a range of
new and—for many developing countries—higher and
more extensive IP standards.  The implications of this
shift in sovereignty over IP policy were profound and,
for many developing countries, not fully understood.  At
the most general level, TRIPS committed countries to
the proposition that the privatization of knowledge was
a pre-condition  for economic growth and inclusion in
the global economy.  More specifically, it constrained
their ability to calibrate levels of IP protection to achieve
development objectives, such as promoting domestic
industries or regulating the prices of medicines.
Although some developing-country negotiators
viewed TRIPS as the price to pay to end the debate
about IP, in practice it proved to be only the beginning.
The corporate and national interests behind TRIPS
treated it as a floor for new IP policy development, not a
ceiling.  IP rights and obligations continued to prolifer-
ate in the form of new ‘TRIPS+’ levels of protection
built into bilateral and multilateral trade agreements.
They proliferated as IPRs were extended to new fields of
human creativity (databases, genes) and to peripheral
forms of innovation (patents on business methods, pro-
tection for clinical studies, technological controls on dig-
ital content).  Other regulatory actors also became
involved as they saw opportunities and threats in the
emerging trade framework.  The World Intellectual
Property Organization (WIPO) worked to recover its
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primacy in IP governance by building new layers of reg-
ulation that went beyond the TRIPS agreement—with
special attention to digital technologies.  The
Convention on Biological Diversity (or CBD, 1993)
established a mechanism for states to negotiate rights to
the biological and genetic wealth within their borders.
By the mid-1990s, some scholars were calling this prolif-
eration of new ownership claims and technologies the
‘second enclosure movement.’
Not all efforts at enclosing the knowledge commons
have succeeded: the longstanding goal of ‘patent harmo-
nization’—the resolving of differences in national patent
laws—has been notably resistant to progress, in part due
to greater developing-country awareness of the value of
remaining areas of policy autonomy.   Nor has regulato-
ry growth been consistent, coordinated, or even compat-
ible at times.  Confusion in the face of overlapping
international directives is common.  The ownership of
plant genetic resources, for example, is subject to three
very different agreements enacted in the last 13 years:
TRIPS, the CBD, and the 2004 ‘International Treaty on
Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture’ (or
IT Treaty), which seeks to reinforce the concept of
shared human ownership of plant genetic resources
diminished by TRIPS and the CBD.  Rights and obliga-
tions of many kinds have multiplied faster than capaci-
ties to manage them.  The high cost of navigating these
systems has produced its own dynamics, such as con-
strained ‘freedom to operate’ in many research fields and
industry consolidation as a means of pooling IP and
managing IP risk.
This relationship between the proliferation of rights
and the difficulty of transacting them has fostered skep-
ticism toward the ‘standard innovation model’ of IPRs.
Traditionally, the justification for strong and pervasive
IPRs is that by completing markets for knowledge and
ideas they enable efficient transactions.  When the sec-
ond half of this proposition fails, IPRs begin to look less
like a strategy for promoting innovation than one for
protecting investment and excluding competition.
Inefficiency is especially dangerous in the context of
patents on ‘enabling technologies’ that support future
innovation, such as research tools and software plat-
forms.  Monopoly control of a bottleneck in knowledge
production can dampen innovation rather than promote
it. Insufficient market power, in contrast, can give rise to
‘patent thickets,’ in which rights are so diffuse or uncer-
tain that no one can act.  
Few people appreciated these dynamics in 1994, but by
the late 1990s they had begun to find a wider audience.
The growing disaster of HIV/AIDS in Africa highlight-
ed the paradox of an innovation system that could
develop effective treatments, widely available in the
west, but not bring them to bear on a humanitarian
emergency.  The 2001 entry-into-force of the TRIPS
agreement for middle-tier economies threatened to make
this situation worse, as India, Brazil, and other produc-
ers of cheap generic drugs were required to extend
patent protection to pharmaceuticals.  Similar patterns
repeated in other fields.  Agribusinesses had accumulated
vast quantities of IP that they refused to either market,
due to insufficient prospects of returns, or release, due
to fear of competition.  Copyright industries, facing a
revolution in media technologies, scrambled for legal
and technical measures to secure the new digital market-
places.   
Because of the Rockefeller Foundation’s longstanding
investments in both ends of the innovation cycle—the
development of new technologies and their application
to social needs—its work was connected and increasing-
ly vulnerable to the growing complexity and imbalances
of the global IP regime.  This risk was illustrated in the
Foundation-sponsored ‘golden rice’ initiative of the
1990s, in the course of which the production of a new
vitamin-enhanced rice variety was blocked for several
years by a ‘thicket’ of privately-held patents on the
underlying technologies.  A solution was eventually
found through the negotiation of an agreement among
the key IP holding partners in the project.  The
Foundation faced similar challenges in the health field,
where it had invested heavily in institutions that could
coordinate public and private research on new medi-
cines, and then license those products on preferential
terms to developing countries (and other humanitarian
actors).  The International Aids Vaccine Initiative (IAVI,
1996) was the largest of these initiatives.  Early IAVI
experience confirmed the complexity of this kind of
project management, and the lack of wider norms or
accepted practices to guide it.
By the late 1990s, Food Security and Health Equity
staff at the Foundation were devoting more time and
resources to ensuring that the benefits of public and
philanthropic investment in new technologies reached
those most in need.  In a context of increasingly compli-
cated public-private research partnerships (PPPs), this
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4depended on good relationships with private-sector
actors.  Rockefeller grantees increasingly needed negoti-
ated solutions with the private sector to ensure access to
research tools, essential seeds, and medicines. It also
became apparent that the Foundation had a role in
advocating new models of IP management to overcome
the legal, cultural and technological barriers to access.
In 1999, Rockefeller President Gordon Conway’s stance
against ‘terminator’ technologies in seeds—which pre-
vented farmers from saving and reusing seeds with desir-
able traits—provided a high-profile public example of
this approach, and a signal of stronger Foundation
engagement with issues of access and control.  In this
case, the Foundation won an agreement from Monsanto
to abandon its terminator gene plans.
The complexity of these arrangements also gave rise
to a strategy of investment in public-interest capacities
for IP management, in order to inform institutional
choices about how and when to publish, patent, and
license their technologies.  IP management strategies
were needed to ensure that vital research and develop-
ment paths remained unencumbered by private claims
and that licensing arrangements served public ends.
They promised to lower the information costs inherent
in navigating complex, overlapping IP regimes.  These
were difficulties faced by both public and private-sector
institutions, and were a basic obstacle to making the IP
innovation model work in poor countries.   By 2000,
efforts were underway in both the Health Equity and
Food Security areas to identify points where investments
in IP management could improve developing country
access to medicines, plant genetic resources, and other
vital knowledge goods.  Collectively, these were invest-
ments in institutional policies, not policy change at the
national or global level. They were investments in mak-
ing the existing IP system work more effectively in poor
countries, not efforts to change the rules.  
A third line of Rockefeller IP work grew out of the
‘Creativity in the Digital Age’ initiative, established in
1999 within the Creativity and Culture theme.   This
project focused on the convergence of art, science, and
information technology, and on the accompanying
growth of new forms of cultural agency, from the plas-
ticity of audio-visual media, to new forms of collabora-
tion and sharing.  These developments posed diverse
and sometimes fundamental challenges to the legal and
The Bellagio Conference on Cultural
Agency / Cultural Authority
March 11-13, 1993
The launch of the IP Program and the Bellagio confer-
ence series marked a tipping point in a process of edu-
cation within the Foundation about the impact of IP
policy on its core missions.This process was supported
by dialogue between staff and an array of external part-
ners working in law, health, trade, development, agricul-
tural science, and other areas of long-term Foundation
interest. In 2000 and 2001, this was a diverse group
with relatively few lateral connections or long-term
experience with IP policy concerns. Collectively, how-
ever, they had numerous connections to different
Rockefeller staff—a fact that helped underwrite a con-
vergence of interest in IP among staff, if not consensus
about solutions. By 2001, this conversation had
achieved sufficient critical mass to support a shift in
Foundation strategies and the launch of the IP Program.
It was not yet an effective force for global IP policy
change, despite some success in the area of access to
medicines. The IP program was designed in large part
to strengthen and expand this network.
The importance of this threshold moment of field for-
mation for the process of change within the Foundation
can be illustrated in part by the lack of uptake of an
earlier version of this conversation held in 1993, also at
Bellagio. The ‘Bellagio Conference on Cultural Agency /
Cultural Authority’ brought together a different set of
actors who had begun to investigate the relationship
between the emerging global IP regime, human creative
capacities, and broad areas of social welfare. The group
tilted heavily toward lawyers, anthropologists, new
media researchers, and literary scholars involved in
exploring the history of authorship and the future of
digitally-mediated cultural production. It was this disci-
plinary intersection—rooted in part in the wave of
recent interest in the legal construction of authorship—
that produced some of the earliest understanding of the
direction and consequences of global IP policy. The
conference produced a ‘Bellagio Declaration’ that identi-
fied many of the challenges that Rockefeller would take
up eight years later. It noted that:
First: Intellectual property laws have profound effects on
issues as disparate as scientific and artistic progress, bio-
diversity, access to information, and the cultures of
indigenous and tribal peoples. Yet all too often those
laws are constructed around a paradigm that is selec-
tively blind to the scientific and artistic contributions of
many of the world’s cultures and constructed in fora
      
economic organization of culture, from the growth of
collaborative models of production that had no singular
‘author’  to the diminishing cost of reproducing and dis-
tributing digital works.  From the start, Rockefeller
engaged efforts to articulate the public’s rights to use
and innovate with the new technologies.  It supported
policy analysis of ‘fair use’ provisions of copyright in the
new digital environment and inquiry into the future of
the cultural institutions that depended on them, such as
libraries.  It encouraged experiments in extending new
‘open source’ models of software production to other
areas of cultural practice, such as the digital arts.  Events
such as the Collaboration and Ownership in the Digital
Economy (CODE) Conference, held in Cambridge
(UK) in 2001, provided important gathering points for
this nascent cultural and technological movement.  
Distinct from other areas of Rockefeller interest, the
Digital Age agenda worked in areas where critical per-
spectives on the IP system and experimental alternatives
to it had become relatively common.  With some signifi-
cant exceptions, this line of Foundation work had a
strong US-based research and advocacy agenda, visible
in the funding of groups such as Public Knowledge,
Creative Commons, the Future of Music Coalition, the
American Assembly, and the American Library
Association.   
The opportunity for a more explicit Foundation
approach to global policy began to emerge in 2000 and
2001, as groups of NGOs and academics with critical
perspectives on globalization began to reframe these as
critical positions on IP policy.  
Early coordination among these experts began to clar-
ify some of the preconditions for successful IP policy
reform, beginning with wider access to policy fora for
public-interest NGOs, greater expertise and better coor-
dination among developing-country delegates and
national ministries, and closer monitoring of the policy
venues in which innovation and access to knowledge
were at stake.
These ideas found fuel in a number of controversial,
widely-publicized cases of IP enclosure.  Among the
most prominent were biopiracy cases involving the for-
eign patenting of indigenously cultivated plants—the
(Mexican) Enola bean, the (Indian) Neem tree, or the
(Madagascaran) Rosy Periwinkle; the criminalization of
certain kinds of computer research with implications for
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where those who will be most directly affected have no
representation.
Second: Many of these problems are built into the basic
structure and assumptions of intellectual property.
Contemporary intellectual property law is constructed
around the notion of the author, the individual, solitary,
and original creator, and it is for this figure that its pro-
tections are reserved. Those who do not fit this model—
custodians of tribal culture and medical knowledge, collec-
tives practicing traditional artistic and musical forms, or
peasant cultivators of valuable seed varieties, for exam-
ple—are denied intellectual property protection.
Third: Such a system has strongly negative consequences.
Increasingly, traditional knowledge, folklore, genetic materi-
al and native medical knowledge flow out of their respec-
tive countries of origin unprotected by intellectual proper-
ty, while works from developed countries flow in, well pro-
tected by international intellectual property agreements,
backed by the threat of trade sanctions
Fourth: Systems built around the author paradigm tend to
obscure or undervalue the importance of “the public
domain,” the intellectual and cultural commons from
which future works will be constructed…. The aggressive
expansion of intellectual property rights has the potential
to inhibit development and future creation by fencing of
“the commons.”
In general, we favor an increased recognition and pro
tection of the public domain. We call on the interna
tional community to expand the public domain 
through expansive application of concepts of “fair use,”
compulsory licensing, and narrower initial coverage of 
property rights in the first place. [The] main excep
tion to this expansion of the public domain should be 
in favor of those who have been excluded specifically 
by the authorial biases of the law.
By 2004, the Bellagio conversations had reached a similar
set of conclusions via discussions of trade, health advoca-
cy, food security, and indigenous rights. By that time,
Rockefeller and other donors had cultivated more robust
policy and advocacy networks that could translate this
critique into action at the WTO,WIPO, and other global
policy venues.
    
6digital copyright; and the suit brought by pharmaceuti-
cal companies against the South African government
over access to patented medicines, among the most
prominent.  
Central to this process was the growing debate about
the priority of public health over intellectual property
rights—a debate catalyzed by the AIDS crisis and the
development of effective but, for low-income countries,
unaffordable drug treatments.  Via grants to CPTech
and other organizations, the Rockefeller Foundation
played a key role in the public advocacy work that led to
the 2001 ‘Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public
Health,’ which affirmed the right of countries to use
existing flexibilities in the TRIPS agreement to protect
public health, including compulsory licensing for
patented medicines.  Much of the subsequent global
health policy agenda of the Rockefeller IP program and
the Bellagio series derived from this work.  Among the
most urgent questions was how countries with no phar-
maceutical manufacturing capacities—and therefore no
way to benefit from compulsory licenses—could exercise
their right to public health under TRIPS.
The Doha declaration signaled to many developing-
country actors and international advocacy groups that
TRIPS was not written in stone, and that struggles over
the revision and interpretation of global IP policy were
both possible and necessary.   A belated but powerful
conversation about the ownership of knowledge in the
global information society was underway.
The lateness of this effort was not lost on the princi-
pals in this conversation.  There had been little apprecia-
tion of these issues when the architecture of global trade
and global IP regulation was built in the late 1980s.
There was not much more when it was ratified in the
early 1990s and extended to digital technologies a few
years later.  Still, in 2000 and 2001, many advocates saw
a window of opportunity for making important changes
to the IP regime.  The poorest countries were not yet
required to comply with TRIPS, and the implications of
middle-tier country compliance in 2001 were not clear.
Media industry intentions for the digital economy had
been signaled more than once, but the technologies that
would enable rigorous control of content and technical
innovation were not yet in place.  Important policy dis-
cussions about patents, the ownership of genetic
resources, and the protections afforded traditional
knowledge were still ongoing.  Promising new models
for expanding access to knowledge and collaborating
across large groups were showing their potential or get-
ting underway, from Free/Open Source Software
(F/OSS), to the public genome project, to Creative
Commons, to open access publishing initiatives such as
the Public Library of Science (PLoS).
These developments resonated strongly with the work
of the Global Inclusion unit, which had been established
to foster cross-thematic coordination within the
Foundation.  Global policy—and increasingly IP poli-
cy—was a natural focus for this work.
The Rockefeller Foundation’s IP Program grew directly
out of this critical engagement with IP within its partner
networks.  The collective sense of urgency—of diminish-
ing opportunities to build an equitable global knowledge
society—informed a five-year program plan organized
around the goal of “fairness” in IP policy.  Fairness, in
this context, meant balancing four general objectives:
• Reasonable returns on investment in research 
and development.
• Access to key research technologies and end 
products (such as medicines). 
• Investment in research and development in 
areas with low commercial prospects.
• Protection of knowledge and materials created 
outside the commodity economy (such as tradi-
tional knowledge).
Substantively, it implied grantmaking in three gener-
al areas:
• Advancing the IP debate through policy analy-
sis, policy development, and attention to 
process and representation in national and glob-
al policy settings.
• Strengthening institutional capacities, leader-
ship, and coordination among pro-development
actors in the IP field, with an emphasis on 
developing countries. 
• Exploring and supporting alternative policy 
frameworks, models of innovation, and prac
tices of IP management. 
These different layers of work satisfied a strategic
need, on the part of the program, to explore IP as both
THE INTELLECTUAL 
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a policy concern and as a practical framework that struc-
tured research and access to technology.  In part, this
diversity reflected different perspectives on IP within the
Foundation.  The Health Equity and Food Security agen-
das of the late 1990s, for example, had focused primarily
on helping intermediaries use the IP system more effec-
tively.  The new program incorporated and extended this
work.  The Global Inclusion agenda, in contrast, fostered
more critical perspectives on rulemaking within global
institutions like WIPO and the WTO.  Over time, all of
the themes supported the development of alternatives to
the standard innovation model, in which high IPRs are
the primary spur to invention and discovery.
Rockefeller work on IP was organized as a ‘cross-the-
matic’ program that drew resources and staff support
from all the major Foundation areas.  This horizontal
network created incentives to coordinate differences in
approach, but not—in the end—to strongly consolidate
them.  The program consistently operated on multiple,
relatively self-contained tracks.  Frequent meetings of the
‘IP Team’ provided opportunities to develop linkages
between these projects, and many reflected and benefited
from such consultation and, in some cases, co-funding.
Shared concern with biotechnology in the Health Equity
and Food Security units provided the main opportunity
for partnerships.   The funding of CAMBIA’s biotechnol-
ogy patent database was a notable example.
The prominence of the medicines question, of tech-
nology-focused development issues, and of the TRIPS
agreement in the early phase of IP global policy advocacy
matched up well with the Foundation’s core investments
in health and agricultural research.  This alignment
stamped the program and, ultimately, the Bellagio series,
with a strong emphasis on technological innovation and
access, and on the regulatory tools proper to them, such
as patents.  As other donors such as the Open Society
Institute and the MacArthur Foundation entered the IP
area in 2002-2003, health and agricultural technologies
remained a natural Rockefeller specialization.  Partly in
light of this specialization, OSI, MacArthur, and later the
Ford Foundation prioritized areas of cultural expression,
digital technology, education, and copyright.  The four-
year evolution of the Bellagio series was in part the story
of the convergence of these debates.  
Where the IP Program met a need for coordination with-
in the Foundation, the Bellagio series focused on coordi-
nating and strengthening external partner networks and
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policy communities.  The series inherited the mixed
agenda of the IP program and partially reproduced it in a
number of distinct conference ‘threads’ led by core
Rockefeller partners.  Each of these threads played out
over several years and multiple events. They provided the
unifying themes, core participant groups, and longer-
term engagement required to act strategically in policy
environments.  Over time, they fostered closer relation-
ships among key subsets of the IP community.
Global trade and development policy was the most
central of these threads, reflecting the prominence and
cross-cutting nature of TRIPS.  Health was a second and
closely-related focus, with special attention to the oppor-
tunities and challenges presented by the Doha
Declaration.  Access to plant genetic resources was a
third, taking up both the challenges encountered in
Rockefeller Food Security work and the confusing state
of international agreements on ownership and access to
genetic materials.  IP issues facing indigenous peoples
were a fourth thread, encompassing both substantive
issues such as the protection of indigenously cultivated
plants as well as concerns with policy expertise and politi-
cal representation in governance forums.   A fifth, under-
lying concern was the exploration of new and alternative
systems of innovations, from new practices of IP manage-
ment to Open Source models of collaboration.
Bellagio organizers also worked to build connections
between the threads, and in the process to give flesh to a
still mostly notional pro-development IP coalition.  This
lateral work was pursued through two main strategies:
synthetic discussions that ‘cross-fertilized’ topics from dif-
ferent events and the close scheduling of the conferences
themselves each fall, which, it was hoped, would enable
cross-over participation.  The first strategy was generally
considered a success: the series of pro-development ‘IP
agenda’ meetings led by ICTSD (the International
Center for Trade and Sustainable Development) and
UNCTAD (the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development) used the global trade and policy lens to
bring together a wide range of concerns from public
health to technology transfer to the fate of the commons.
Meetings on health and on food security also bridged dis-
tinct problems and strategies, from patent pools and
other forms of IP management, to the role of ‘open
source’ models of collaboration in the life sciences, to
novel public funding and private liability alternatives to
IP-based innovation systems. 
Logistical issues made the second strategy less success-
ful in a narrow sense: few participants could invest the
time required to attend multiple meetings at a time.
Moreover, few participants outside Rockefeller staff—
and, with staff turnover, even among Rockefeller staff—
THE BELLAGIO DIALOGUES
    
had the vantage point to understand the series as part of
a single enterprise in more than general terms.  The
dynamics of this problem were suggested in a post-2002
series survey of participants, in which 91% of partici-
pants indicated that the conference they attended had
strengthened their sense of participation in a larger com-
munity of development-oriented IP practitioners, but
only 59% were aware that their conference was part of a
larger series.  A brochure, “Promoting a Fairer Course
for Intellectual Property Policies and Practices,” was pro-
duced in 2003 to provide a stronger public identity and
sense of continuity for the events.  No further surveys or
promotional efforts were conducted.
Participants in the Bellagio series often praised the
meetings for ‘cross-fertilizing’ ideas and perspectives
from different fields.  Effective conference organization,
the convening power of the Foundation, and the residen-
tial setting of Bellagio certainly contributed to this
process.  But such exchanges also depended on the care-
fully-constructed role of the series within a larger ecology
of actors, institutions, and projects.  The conferences
were designed to meet diverse research, advocacy, and
practitioner needs, from networking to policymaking to
project incubation.  The feedback loop between the
series and the IP program meant that the series echoed
parts of the program’s agenda and also shaped it over
time.  This relationship helped the pro-development IP
community coalesce and advance its work on many dif-
ferent fronts over time.  Throughout its four-year run,
the series continued to generate new projects, networks,
and policy initiatives.
The series became a focal point for a larger communi-
ty of actors by cultivating these outward connections.  In
most cases, Bellagio conferences were part of a wider net-
work of activities that included preparatory meetings,
follow-on events, and connections to larger projects
organized by Rockefeller partners.   Many of these sec-
ondary convenings were viewed by organizers and partic-
ipants as part of the Bellagio series.  
Supporting this extended network was part of the
field-building ambition of the IP Program.  It also
reflected thinking about the comparative advantage of
the Foundation as a convener in the larger IP policy
space.  By drawing together the overlapping and geo-
graphically dispersed networks of Rockefeller partners,
the Bellagio meetings fostered an increasingly coordinat-
ed and well-resourced ‘pro-development’ global IP policy
community.  Over time, this more cohesive community
proved successful in translating Bellagio recommenda-
tions into policy conversations at WIPO, the WTO, and
other governance fora.  
Structures of Participation
The continuity of the Bellagio series from year to year
and across the different threads of work was ultimately
maintained by a small group of Rockefeller staff, organ-
izers, and major partners. Over four years, the series
brought together some 220 different participants, of
whom about thirty became repeat attendees. Of
these, approximately ten attended three or more
meetings, with a majority representing core grantees of
the IP program: ICTSD and the South Centre; the
Meridian Institute; the Call of the Earth Circle; and
CPTech.
Bellagio Conference Timeline
8
  
9In the fall of 2002, the goal of building a meaningful
‘development agenda’ for IP was framed primarily by the
TRIPS agreement.  TRIPS had come into effect in mid-
dle-income countries in 2001 (least-developed countries
had five more years to comply).  By 2002, a number of
problems with TRIPS were apparent:
• TRIPS implementation was expected to produce a
$20 billion transfer of wealth from low and middle-
income countries to high-income countries.
• Strong enforcement of intellectual property regimes
was proving costly and impractical in many coun-
tries, exposing them to censor and sanction through
the WTO and other trade agreements.
• National sovereignty over matters of public health,
food security, and economic development were
diminished by TRIPS without significant evidence
of countervailing benefits.  Bilateral and multilateral
trade agreements tended to erode this sovereignty
further, as TRIPS became the floor for new agree-
ments.
• Developing countries continued to be outmaneu-
vered in the WTO, and had little effective capacity 
or leverage to influence decision making. 
• High-income countries, led by the US, EU, and
Japan, continued to press for further ‘harmoniza-
tion’ around around higher levels of protection and
more pervasive application of IPRs.
These policy concerns set the stage for the annual
‘Dialogue’ conferences organized by ICTSD (the
International Center for Trade and Sustainable
Development) and UNCTAD (the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development).   This thread
within the Bellagio series was arguably the broadest in
its concerns and most synthetic in its approach.  It was
premised on the need to explore relationships among the
diverse areas of IP policy impact.   Expert papers com-
missioned ahead of the meetings contributed to this
knowledge-building process, and allowed the meetings
to move quickly beyond basic fact finding.  Policy dis-
cussions within the meetings helped develop applica-
tions for this knowledge.
Maintaining close contact with IP policy processes
meant that participants in and audiences for the work
regularly overlapped.  The meetings both relied on
experts in trade, health, law and other fields and,
through the discussions, helped those experts under-
stand their work in wider policy contexts.  The meetings
drew on developing-country officials and delegates to
WIPO and the WTO, and, through that involvement,
encouraged a sense of national ownership of resulting
policy initiatives.  Special attention was paid to the
wider and increasingly coordinated transnational civil
society movement—especially consumer, health, and
technology advocacy organizations in the US and EU.
These networks became adept at translating complex IP
policy concerns to wider publics.  Lastly, the meetings
involved and addressed the donor community, which
had begun to take an interest in IP issues but which had
not yet developed programmatic approaches to IP poli-
cy.
Many of these actors were based in Geneva, in prox-
imity to the WTO, WIPO, WHO and other key global
governance bodies.  In particular, the ICTSD/UNC-
TAD events were tied to a larger group of Geneva
NGOs who used the conferences as policy laboratories
and project incubators.  Building the IP research and
advocacy capacities of this small network was a key
strategic choice of the IP Program, and a focus of the
Global Inclusion unit in particular. 
The ‘development-oriented agenda’ signaled in the
title of several of the ICTSD/UNCTAD meetings was
not a document but rather the four-year conversation
itself, channeled through Bellagio, captured in reports,
and advanced through a wide range of associated proj-
ects, papers, and conferences.  The goals of this conver-
sation were articulated in a 2002 strategy paper prepared
after the first meeting, entitled “Towards Development-
Oriented Intellectual Property Policy: Setting an Agenda
for the Next Five Years.” The paper offered a wide-rang-
ing challenge to the direction of post-TRIPS IP policy-
making and to the failures of process in global gover-
nance that continued to disadvantage developing coun-
tries.  It offered a series of broadly-framed propositions
for making IP policy accountable to development objec-
tives, beginning with the need for developing countries
to preserve and use existing flexibilities within interna-
tional IP agreements.  The documents offered sugges-
tions for new treaty initiatives that could rebalance the
terms of global trade, and made arguments for improv-
ing technical assistance programs to developing coun-
tries.   It identified areas where effective policy was
impossible without a stronger knowledge base of
GLOBAL POLICY, DEVELOPMENT,
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research and data, and suggested strategies through which
policy change could be realistically pursued.  
The framing concerns of this statement were not fun-
damentally new in 2002; nor did they change significantly
in the course of subsequent meetings.  Conversations
would continue to revolve around and build on four main
themes: 
• the role and future of IP in the multilateral 
trading system; 
• the challenge of new treaty development and 
harmonization; 
• the promotion of effective national policy for
mulation; and 
• the integration of IP policies into development 
strategies. 
In 2002, these themes informed a pro-development
agenda focused primarily on defensive strategies with
regard to TRIPS, capacity building in developing coun-
tries, and research on areas of policy impact that remained
obscure.  Specific recommendations included:
• Stopping the IP harmonization process at WIPO—
especially in regard to the proposed Substantive Patent
Law Treaty (SPLT).  The agenda proposed a major
research investment by NGOs geared toward analyz-
ing the costs of declining national discretion over IP
policy.
• Contesting efforts by the US and EU to impose 
TRIPS+ standards of protection through newer
WIPO treaties and bilateral and regional trade agree-
ments.
• Maintaining and encouraging the use of flexibilities
within TRIPS (and other agreements) to promote
public health and other pro-development goals.
Continuing discussions around the ‘Doha Declaration
on TRIPS and Public Health’ provided the main
focus for this conversation.
• Insisting on higher standards of evidence and data
collection on the impact of IP policy, especially with
respect to developing countries and development
objectives.   Again and again, these meetings would
highlight the dearth of serious research and data in
this area.  ‘Development assessments’ of the impact of
new laws were almost never conducted.
• Moving WIPO toward an explicit commitment to
development as an objective, and toward reforms of
process and participation.
• Improving and expanding technical assistance pro-
grams to strengthen developing-country capacities to
formulate and implement IP policies that addressed
their specific needs.  
• Working to resolve confusion about the relationship
between existing treaties, especially between TRIPS,
the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) and
the new ‘IT’ treaty on plant genetic resources.
• Resisting the creation of new constraints on user
innovation in the digital arena, including ‘anti-cir-
cumvention’ measures and other policies.
• Working toward the broader reframing of IP policy as
part of a debate about technology transfer and devel-
opment—about technology for development.  The
desirability of a ‘technology treaty’ or ‘research and
development treaty’ was signaled in this document,
and would come up repeatedly in future meetings.
In 2002, the main ICTSD/UNCTAD ‘dialogue’ was
complemented by two other conferences.  ‘Empowering
New IP Leadership’ brought together educators and
organizations engaged in IP capacity building and techni-
cal assistance to design a mentoring strategy for future IP
policy leaders from developing countries.  ‘Technology
Transfer and Human Development’ was a smaller gather-
ing of economists and lawyers focused on engaging the
newly formed WTO Working Group on Technology
Transfer.  In the first case, no new capacity-building initia-
tives emerged, and the mentoring role fell primarily to the
Background Papers
All of the policy papers and reports from the ICTSD/UNCTAD conferences are available online at
http://www.iprsonline.org/index.htm
The South Centre also has an online archive of related materials available at
http://www.southcentre.org/IPProject/ipindex.htm
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The Geneva NGOs
The core Geneva IP network comprised four organiza-
tions: ICTSD, the South Centre, CIEL, and QUNO. These
brought distinctive and, in many respects, complementary
forms of expertise to questions of development, IP policy
analysis, and policy advocacy. They occupied a relatively
small social and professional world in Geneva, which pro-
vided many opportunities for collaboration and close con-
nection to the communities of country delegates and offi-
cials. Between 2001 and 2006, the four organizations
received multiple grants from the Foundation to collabo-
rate on IP policy research, technical assistance to develop-
ing countries, and advocacy.
• The International Centre for Trade and Sustainable
Development (ICTSD) was established in 1996 to
support trade policies that favor sustainable develop-
ment. Its primary activities are policy research and
communication.
• The South Centre is an intergovernmental body of
developing countries established in 1995 to advise and
provide technical support to its members on interna-
tional policy issues. Trade, development, and access to
knowledge have been major foci of its work.
• The Center for International Environmental Law
(CIEL) is a public interest, non-profit environmental
law firm, established in 1989, that has been a key con-
tributor to IP policy monitoring and analysis in rela-
tion to biodiversity, trade, and sustainable develop-
ment.
• The Quaker United Nations Office (QUNO) brings
policy expertise on trade and IP issues to this net-
work. It has been funded by the IP program through a
collaboration with the South Centre.
Another frequent partner in this work was UNCTAD—
the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development. UNCTAD co-organized several of the
Bellagio conferences with ICTSD. It has a long history of
pro-development policy engagement.
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existing network of Geneva NGOs—notably the South
Centre, which received a Rockefeller grant to expand its
training and fellowship capacities.  The technology transfer
meeting produced a research agenda and advocacy strategy
designed to advance and reframe the technology transfer
conversation among OECD and developing-country repre-
sentatives.  This work was folded into a sustaining grant to
ICTSD, and pursued in two Geneva conferences in 2003.
The second Dialogue in 2003 followed the path laid by
the 2002 event.  It deepened the analysis of TRIPS+ initia-
tives (now in light of the August 2003 ‘Medicines
Decision’), movement toward patent harmonization, and the
apparent stalemate of discussions about traditional knowl-
edge and genetic resources at WIPO.  It revisited the ques-
tion of technology transfer, focusing in particular on strate-
gies for implementing TRIPS obligations toward least-devel-
oped countries.  And it developed a more detailed account
of needed reforms to technical assistance for developing
countries.  
By 2004, several factors had combined to make a defen-
sive focus on TRIPS less central to the pro-development IP
community—among them, the provisional settlement of the
medicines question; the relative lack of traction on technolo-
gy transfer issues; growing advocacy interest in copyright
and the regulation of the digital economy; and the promi-
nence of WIPO and bilateral/regional trade agreements as
engines of new IP policy.  The 2004 Dialogue tracked this
shift in ideas, risks, and opportunities.  Called ‘Moving the
Pro-Development Agenda Forward: Preserving Public Goods
in Health, Education, and Learning,’ the conference
explored new positive rights frameworks and efforts to foster
‘public goods’ in knowledge—i.e. knowledge subject to few
or no access restrictions.  The meeting took place amidst a
flurry of larger initiatives advanced by members of the
Bellagio network—the acceptance of the ‘Development
Agenda’ framework at the September WIPO General
Assembly, the drafting of the ‘Research and Development
Treaty,’ and the discussions that would lead to the drafting
of the Access to Knowledge treaty in early 2005.  The meet-
ing also signaled a partial convergence of the health and
agricultural technology agendas with issues of digital culture
and copyright—bringing the series closer to the integrated
approach to IP and innovation policy envisioned in the first
stages of the work.  This shift was signaled in three new lines
of inquiry: 
• Data Exclusivity: the protection of clinical trials and
other data associated with the regulatory approval of
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new medicines.  Although TRIPS was relatively flex-
ible on this question, preventing generic-producing
competitors from accessing data submitted by
patent holders has become a prominent TRIPS+ fea-
ture of bilateral and regional trade agreements.
Protecting trial data raises the costs of developing
alternatives to patented drugs during much of the
patent period.  It means that parallel research is left
without benchmarks for evaluating the comparative
efficacy of potentially competing drugs.  Given the
long lead times of drug development, this is an
obstacle to competition.   
The data exclusivity discussions signaled an effort by
Rockefeller staff and the Geneva partners to get
ahead of an emerging problem.  Data exclusivity
had escaped significant notice by IP advocates in
part because it had minimal implications for the
process of making generic copies of standard drugs,
which were usually chemically identical to the
Global Policy Contributions
Because the Bellagio series was connected at so many
levels to the work of the pro-development IP communi-
ty, there are few exclusive cause-and-effect relationships
between the series and particular policy outcomes. The
series made major contributions to several policy
accomplishments—notably the 2003 Medicines Decision,
its formal adoption at the WIPO Ministerial meeting in
Hong Kong (2005), and the development and acceptance
of the ‘Development Agenda’ in WIPO in 2004. Bellagio
also contributed to initiatives that have only recently
gained traction within global governance bodies, such as
the ‘Research and Development Treaty’ for healthcare—
the principles of which were adopted in May 2006 by
the World Health Organization. Important contribu-
tions were made to TRIPS and WIPO discussions on the
‘disclosure of origins’ of genetic materials in patent
applications as that issue gained momentum in 2004 and
2005. In each of these cases, the translation of develop-
ment goals into multinational fora produced compromis-
es that have been controversial among the original pro-
ponents of the measures—most starkly in the case of
the Medicines decision. In each case, however, compro-
mise represents a shift in the larger framework of dis-
cussion around IP. The alignment of IP policy with rich
country interests is no longer uncontested. Even the
most diminished of these agreements reflect success on
the part of NGOs and developing country governments
in opening global IP fora to discussions about develop-
ment.
2003-.The Medicines Decision. Rockefeller Foundation
grantees played an important role in clarifying the impli-
cations of TRIPS for public health and in launching a poli-
cy process intended to ensure that TRIPS addressed the
health needs of developing countries. The most impor-
tant achievement of this work pre-dated the IP program:
CPTech and other Rockefeller grantees played a signifi-
cant role in securing the 2001 Doha Declaration on
TRIPS and Public Health, which affirmed the right of
countries to issue compulsory licenses on patented
medicines in order to protect public health. The decla-
ration did not settle how countries with no pharmaceu-
tical manufacturing capacity were to exercise this right.
This topic became the center of a subsequent debate in
2002, and marked a large part of the early Bellagio agen-
da. Bellagio conferences in 2002 and 2004 were used to
coordinate NGO and academic support of developing-
country positions in this debate. They informed the
2003 compromise that specified the right of poor coun-
tries to import generic versions of patented drugs from
third countries (a statement generally referred to as the
‘Medicines Decision’), as well as subsequent debates
about how this agreement was to be formally integrated
into TRIPS. US and EU concerns about the possible par-
allel importation of generic drugs into western markets
also shaped the decision, and produced eligibility
requirements and a licensing mechanism that many pub-
lic health advocates regard as unworkable. The decision
remains controversial and is opposed by many NGOs
working to improve access to medicines. The compulso-
ry licensing mechanism specified in the agreement has
not yet been effectively used.
2004-.The WIPO Development Agenda. The
Development Agenda was the achievement of several
years of collaboration between developing-country gov-
ernments and a small group of NGOs engaged in WIPO
monitoring and policy advocacy—including key Bellagio
partners such as ICTSD, the South Centre, and CPTech.
The Development Agenda was a short statement
designed to shift the role of WIPO from an organization
devoted to protecting intellectual property rights to one
committed to using intellectual property as a tool for
development—bringing it closer, in this respect, to the
priorities of other UN agencies. The Agenda was sub-
mitted by Brazil and Argentina to the WIPO General
Assembly, and passed in 2005. Plans for implementing
the Agenda have predictably generated controversy
about process and scope, and were taken up formally at
the fall 2006 General Assembly. In addition to Brazil and
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patented drugs and possessed the same properties.
Newer drugs produced with biotechnologies, how-
ever, are far more difficult to reverse engineer.
Substitutes are not likely be chemically identical,
and have to be vetted through their own expensive
clinical trials.  Access to clinical data, in these cir-
cumstances, is an increasingly important condition
of both competition and timely manufacture of new
drugs.  The 2004 Dialogue reached a clear consen-
sus that data exclusivity provisions had to be
reversed, and that the results of clinical trials, espe-
cially, should be considered public goods.  This
position became part of the Research and
Development Treaty proposal.
• Compulsory licenses for copyrighted materials:  The
‘access to education’ conversation introduced the
first substantive discussion of copyright in the
series—especially the role that compulsory licensing
might play in ensuring developing-country access to
Argentina, the Development Agenda is backed by 12
other ‘Friends of Development’: Bolivia, Cuba,
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Iran, Kenya, Peru,
Sierra Leone, South Africa,Tanzania and Venezuela.
One possible application of the Agenda is the ‘Access
to Knowledge Treaty’ (below), which was drafted
shortly after the acceptance of the Agenda in fall 2004.
2003-.The Research and Development Treaty. First
explored at a 2003 Bellagio meeting organized by
CPTech, the draft R&D Treaty sketched an alternative
framework of financing research and development in
healthcare technologies, based on the creation of mini-
mum national obligations for investment. Under the
treaty, countries could adopt any method of meeting
these requirements, and in return receive greater lati-
tude in the use of IP produced through the treaty
mechanism. The treaty also proposed strategies for
setting priorities in health research—notably in
response to the ongoing problem of ‘neglected dis-
eases.’  It included requirements that publicly-funded
research remain publicly available, and proposed a
credits trading model to incentivize the creation of
new ‘public goods.’  The drafting process engaged a
wide range of public health NGOs, officials from the
World Health Organization, academic researchers, and
government officials, and continued through a series of
follow-up meetings in 2004. In May 2006, the World
Health Organization approved a resolution calling for
exploration of the research and development frame-
work, based on a version of the treaty draft proposed
by Kenya and Brazil. Work on the design and imple-
mentation of the resolution will pass to an intergov-
ernmental working group.
2005-. Disclosure of Origins of Genetic Materials. The
term refers to the proposition that patent applicants
should be required to disclose the national origins of
genetic materials used in inventions. It has gained
traction in recent years as a means of addressing ‘bio-
piracy’—the foreign patenting of local plant or genetic
materials without the consent of the people or coun-
try of origin. This set of issues was a recurrent and
cross-cutting subject of discussion at Bellagio, bridging
meetings organized by ICTSD, Call of the Earth Circle,
and the Meridian Institute. Bellagio conversations have
contributed to increasingly assertive action by a num-
ber of the ‘megadiverse’ countries—India, Brazil,
Mexico, and Indonesia among them—which hold a dis-
proportionate share of the world’s total biodiversity.
In addition to the fairness claims underlying such a
requirement, disclosure is seen as a means of reconcil-
ing differences between the private ownership of
genetic resources specified in TRIPS and the state
ownership model defined by the Convention on
Biological Diversity (CBD). Although considerable
uncertainty remains regarding the substance and impli-
cations of such a requirement, the issue has been a
recurrent topic in IP governance fora, and was pro-
posed as an amendment to the TRIPS agreement in
2005.
2005-.The Access to Knowledge (A2K) Treaty. The
A2K process built on the momentum created by the
Development Agenda in Fall 2004. A2K was an effort
to codify a set of minimum mandatory limitations and
exceptions to copyright and patent law. Among its
major provisions, the treaty would solidify fair use
rights, especially for educational and archival purposes.
It specifies that publicly-funded research and publica-
tions belong to the public domain, stemming a long
process of ‘enclosure’ of public knowledge. It blocks
the proliferation of new IPRs, such as broadcast rights,
software patents, and the patenting of higher life
forms. More generally, it provides a platform for enu-
merating and expanding positive rights of access,
instead of couching such rights as limitations to IP
laws. Although the Bellagio meetings played no direct
role in this proces, the 2004 agenda-setting meeting
took place amidst this rapidly evolving conversation,
and advanced a number of ideas that appeared in the
eventual draft.
   
educational materials.  The right to issue compulso-
ry licenses was afforded by the Berne Convention,
which in turn formed the basis for the copyright
provisions in TRIPS.  Few believed, however, that
the complicated Berne procedure could be effective-
ly utilized in this or any other context.  The group’s
call for a new compulsory licensing mechanism
became part of the A2K treaty draft, as did its
broader concern with establishing mandatory mini-
mum limitations and exceptions to copyrights.
• Digital technologies:  The 2004 meeting also 
marked the first in-depth discussion of new 
IPRs in the digital arena and their implications 
for development.  The broad direction of IP 
policy in this area were familiar: higher, more 
extensive, and overlapping protections had 
become the norm.  Here again, the group artic
ulated a combination of defensive and positive 
strategies, including:
4 Resisting new sui generis rights over informa
tion, such as the EU’s database right protecting 
the content of databases.
4 Preventing contractual agreements such as ‘click
through’ licenses from overriding default rights 
of access.
4 Raising awareness in developing countries about
Free and Open Source Software (F/OSS), which
has no licensing costs.
4 Requiring the disclosure of patents used in stan
dards setting processes, eliminating the risk of 
private capture of open standards.
4 Encouraging WIPO and other organizations to 
take up the question of anti-competitive prac
tices in the software market. 
The 2005 Dialogue offered both a retrospective on
four years of IP policy advocacy and an effort to extend
and integrate the different threads of the positive agenda
that had begun to coalesce in 2004.  Patents, copyrights,
compulsory licensing, competition policy, the scarcity of
high quality research and—encompassing all—the need
to package and disseminate these concerns to wider con-
stituencies figured prominently in the discussion.  In
several areas, participants reflected on a policy landscape
that was not much changed.  Four years after the first
meetings, the prospect of patent harmonization was still
uncertain.  Movement on the ‘substantive’ issues of har-
monization—concepts of novelty, inventive steps, and
the status of prior art especially—was minimal since the
launch of the WIPO Patent Agenda in 2000.  Many in
the Bellagio process viewed the stalemate as a de facto
victory for developing countries that preserved a key
area of national policy autonomy.  Agreements on
process, in contrast, had been easier, and most partici-
pants saw positive opportunities for lowering the cost
and improving the transparency of national and interna-
tional patent systems. 
At the broadest level, participants viewed growth in
the awareness of IP—both as a policy arena and a dis-
course of power—as a genuine but incomplete accom-
plishment.  Developing countries and civil society actors
had become much more active in global IP debates.
Strategic North-South alliances between developing
countries, consumer groups, and other organizations had
demonstrated their utility.  The outlines of a compre-
hensive pro-development IP agenda had been drawn,
and important elements had been integrated into
WIPO, WTO, and WHO proceedings.  The larger
work of securing, implementing, and extending this
agenda is clearly still in progress.
Improving the productivity of agriculture in develop-
ing countries has been a core commitment of the
Rockefeller Foundation and—over time—an area of
considerable staff specialization and expertise.  Over the
last 50 years, the Foundation has invested some $500
million in research on new crop varieties and other tech-
nologies to improve subsistence farming.  Nearly all of
this investment has flowed into the public sector, reflect-
ing not only the central role of public institutions in
agricultural research, but also a commitment to the cre-
ation of ‘public goods’ that can circulate widely at mini-
mal cost.  This relatively unencumbered circulation of
knowledge and innovation is especially important in
agriculture where, distinct from other technological
fields, research and practice are often one and the same.
Farmers play a fundamental research role in crop
improvement and local adaptation.  Freedom to save,
replant, exchange, and cross breed seeds is a foundation
of this practice. 
Historically, the dominance of public-sector agricul-
tural research ensured a relatively free flow of new
knowledge and genetic materials (mainly seeds) through
the range of public and private actors in the field.  In
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the US, this ecology of knowledge production changed
abruptly in 1980 with the passage of the Bayh-Dole act.
Bayh-Dole allowed universities for the first time to issue
exclusive licenses on technologies developed with public
funds, eliminating the default public status of such
research.  The new prospect of commercializing univer-
sity-based research launched a strong for-profit research
culture within the university system, and set universities
on the road toward complex public-private partnerships
that channeled public research money into private prod-
uct development.  In fields such as agriculture, it paved
the way for the privatization of large public research
holdings.
The wide range of tools for protecting incremental
innovation in agricultural research meant that new plant
varieties could be encumbered by multiple layers of IP
claims.  The complexity of the patent system, especially,
meant that claims could accumulate without any reliable
means of signaling or identifying them.  Patents were
often broad or ambiguous.   Different national patent
regimes added complexity, and made patent research a
task beyond the means of most small research teams.
This shift toward private control transformed agricultur-
al research on many levels, most dramatically by pro-
moting the consolidation of ever larger firms in the sec-
tor as a means of pooling IP and maximizing ‘freedom
to operate.’  
Since the 1990s, new international agreements have
added further complexity.  TRIPS extended the model
of private ownership of PGRs by requiring member
countries to implement plant variety protection meas-
ures—although national governments retained discretion
over the type of protection afforded.  The 1992
Convention on Biological Diversity tried to address the
ambiguity of ownership surrounding native plants by
emphasizing the sovereign rights of states over their ter-
ritorial PGRs, balanced by obligations to negotiate
access to these resources structured around ‘benefit shar-
ing’ agreements with local claimants.  The International
Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and
Agriculture’ (or IT Treaty) was adopted after some seven
years of negotiation by the United Nations’ Food and
Agriculture Organization (FAO) in 2001, and entered
into force until 2004.  It promised a third set of rules
and obligations intended to reinforce a global commons
model for certain basic food crops.  
By 2003, the international policy arena was thus
highly complex, with important differences in approach
embedded in TRIPS and the CBD.  The IT Treaty was
controversial and without a clear plan for implementa-
tion.  Very few countries had taken steps to implement
any of these agreements.  National policy and human
resources lagged far behind the proliferation of interna-
tional rules and obligations.  The result was often confu-
sion and uncertainty at all levels of research and admin-
istration—international agricultural research organiza-
tions, national agricultural ministries, public sector and
non-profit research institutions, farmers and breeders.
Protective stances on ownership, knowledge sharing and
materials transfer became an increasingly common
default response.  For organizations dedicated to foster-
ing research in the developing world, uncertainty was
perceived as a serious threat.
In 1999 and 2000, the Foundation sponsored a sepa-
rate series of ‘Dialogues on Modern Biotechnology,’
focused on understanding implications of transgenic
PGRs for development. The dialogues explored, among
other issues, the shifts in the larger ecology of research
and access, and their consequences for developing-world
agriculture.  The Meridian Institute—a Rockefeller part-
ner in the agricultural research field—was commissioned
to organize this work.  By 2001, these discussions had
coalesced into a strategy for strengthening capacities for
public-interest IP management, focusing on East
Africa—where the Foundation maintained a strong
regional presence—and on the public university system
in the US, which continued to be a dominant source of
innovation in the sector.  This work focused initially on
two major institution-building projects: the African
Agricultural Technology Foundation (AATF), founded
in 2003, and the Public Intellectual Property Resource
for Agriculture (PIPRA), founded in 2004.  Both
worked to develop and facilitate licensing strategies
favorable to developing-world agriculture.  Both worked
to develop and share best practices among public and
private technology managers.  
The unevenness of information about genetic
resources was another prominent concern of the series.
Much of the debate about PGRs in 2000-2002 focused
on the development of databases and information clear-
inghouses that could clarify ownership at lower cost to
researchers.  Following CBD recommendations, several
countries were conducting national inventories of genet-
ic resources.  Rockefeller work in this area focused pri-
marily on the uncertainty surrounding patents and free-
dom to operate.  The IP Program made several grants to
the Center for the Application of Molecular Biology to
International Agriculture (CAMBIA) to fund the devel-
opment of a PGR-focused patent database, as well as
investing in other organizations involved in policy work
on the conservation, use, and exchange of PGRs.  The
Environmental Law Institute (ELI) and the
International Plant Genetics Resources Institute
(IPGRI) figured prominently among these.
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The Bellagio gathering on ‘Genetic Resources’
(September 9-11, 2003) was the capstone to a larger
Rockefeller-sponsored conference held in Rome earlier in
the week.  The Rome event was initially conceived as an
opportunity to share the findings of two Rockefeller-sup-
ported policy projects—the Genetic Resources Policy
Initiative (GRPI), a project of the International Plant
Genetic Resources Institute (IPGRI), and Developing Legal
Frameworks Governing Access to Genetic Resources in
Africa, led by ELI.  Interest in the meeting was such that it
expanded to include some forty representatives of United
Nations, regional, and national organizations involved in
policymaking on genetic resources.  The meeting undertook
a wide-ranging exploration of policy and institutional
capacity issues related to access and use: international policy
concerns with TRIPS, the CBD, and the IT treaty; the
challenges of implementing effective policies and benefit-
sharing practices at the national level; and—arguably the
most difficult—the connections between these global poli-
cies and local and institutional IP management practices.
The follow-up Bellagio meeting brought together a subset
of this group to synthesize findings and make recommenda-
tions.   In general, these focused on the need for capacity
building among stakeholders at the national level as a pre-
condition of effective access and benefit sharing.  In a
multi-stakeholder, multi-disciplinary, multi-modal policy
environment, this effort would necessarily include national
policy teams, researchers and breeders, indigenous groups,
social scientists, national delegates to international venues,
and a number of other groups.  A second cluster of recom-
mendations focused on the need for better information bro-
kering and sharing—with a particular emphasis on clearing-
houses for navigating ownership claims on genetic
resources.  
The second meeting in the series (2004) sought to test
these findings and recommendations in the narrower geo-
graphical context of East and Central Africa, and in partic-
ular relation to the problem of enhancing public-sector
research access to germplasm.  Scientists, plant breeders,
and representatives of local and international NGOs con-
tributed a number of research papers that bore out and
refined many of the concerns of the 2003 meeting.  In gen-
eral, these found:
• high levels of awareness of the international policy
agreements (TRIPS, CBD, ITPGRA) but widespread
Capacity Building for IP Management
AATF and PIPRA were the products of collaboration
between Food Security and Global Inclusion staff. The
planning and development of both institutions was led
by the Meridian Institute—a long-time Rockefeller
partner in this area. This phase of consultation and
institution-building in 2001 and 2002 informed two
Meridian-led meetings on PGRs at Bellagio, and later a
third conference on open source models of innovation
in the life sciences. The continuity provided by
Meridian kept the Food Security agenda closely aligned
with the Bellagio dialogues throughout the four-year
run.
• The African Agricultural Technology Foundation
(AATF, http://www.aatf-africa.org/) was established
to facilitate access to privately-held agricultural
technologies for the benefit of Sub-Saharan Africa.
The AATF model focused on the acquisition of tech-
nologies through royalty-free licenses and agree-
ments, as well as on the last-mile efforts necessary
to make them useful for Africa’s resource-poor
farmers. Initial projects focused on herbicide-resist-
ant maize and pest-resistant cowpea. The participa-
tion of partner organizations from across the
research and product-development spectrum was
crucial to AATF’s organizational model: the founding
brought together some twenty-five stakeholders,
from public-sector research directors, to heads of
African private sector companies, to multinational
life-science companies such as Monsanto.
• Public Intellectual Property Resource for Agriculture
(PIPRA, http://www.pipra.org/) is in certain respects
a public-sector counterpart to AATF, focused on
preserving access to the publicly-funded agricultural
research of U.S.-based universities. PIPRA works to
shift technology licensing in agriculture from the
practice of providing worldwide exclusive rights for
the licensee to one that reserves rights for develop-
ing-country and humanitarian purposes. Some forty
U.S. universities, developing country governments,
and international non-profit organizations are mem-
bers of the PIPRA consortium. PIPRA has grown
significantly since its founding, and may become a
template for other regional efforts at managing the
commercialization of public agricultural research.
• The Center for the Application of Molecular Biology
to International Agriculture (CAMBIA) is a non-
profit biotechnology research organization based in
Canberra,Australia. In 2003 and 2004, Rockefeller
grants supported CAMBIA’s development of the
Patent Lens—a public, PGR-related database of
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patent information designed to help researchers clarify
their ‘freedom to operate’ in the multi-jurisdictional,
often bewilderingly complex patent landscape.
Rockefeller work in Health Equity followed a similar, though
somewhat independent path of developing IP management
strategies for developing-country research institutions. This
led to the founding of the Centre for the Management of
Intellectual Property in Health Research & Development
(MIHR) in 2002.
• The Centre for the Management of Intellectual
Property in Health Research & Development (MIHR,
http://www.mihr.org). MIHR was created to help pub-
licly-funded health research institutions in developing
countries manage the transfer of their innovations to
their own private sector in a form accountable to the
public interest. To this end, MIHR develops and dissem-
inates guidance on best practices in technology man-
agement—notably on the challenges of building effec-
tive local public-private partnerships. More recently,
this work has been extended to publicly-funded
research institutions in high-income countries. The
2003 Handbook of Best Practices is MIHR’s lead publica-
tion.
MIHR planning and development included a 2001 Bellagio
meeting apart from the Bellagio IP series framework.
MIHR—and Rockefeller Health Equity work on IP manage-
ment and innovation systems more generally—remained
largely on a separate track, with only occasional intersec-
tions with the global policy conversations conducted
between 2002 and 2004.
By 2005, a partial convergence of the Health and Genetic
Resource conversations was underway, rooted in common
concerns with the ownership of genetic information, the
relationship between nutrition and health, and the manage-
ment of public/private research boundaries. It reflected,
too, the growth of an increasingly multi-layered approach by
Health Equity staff to interventions in the ‘Global Health
Innovation System.’  This convergence was supported
through IP program grantmaking, and manifested in the
2005 Bellagio conference on models of innovation in the
life sciences. A leading indicator was the IP Program-sup-
ported effort to coordinate the licensing and IP manage-
ment practices of MIHR and PIPRA in 2004.
uncertainty regarding their national and local applica-
tion; 
• uneven and sometimes unrealistic expectations of the
commercial value of genetic resources, with a corre-
sponding growth of proprietary claims and practices.
Many respondents perceived a negative impact of these
agreements on practices of informal, free sharing and
transfer of materials; 
• insufficient coordination and consultation among
stakeholders engaged in research, policy, and decision
making—both horizontally among local actors and ver-
tically between local, national, and international ven-
ues;
• insufficient data on locally available germplasm, and on
regional flows between countries.  The latter question,
especially, pointed to the limitations of CBD-based
national concepts of ownership, which tended to
impose artificial geographical boundaries on genetic
materials. 
Linking all of these issues was the chronic problem of
insufficient human and institutional capacity to address and
manage questions of ownership and innovation. 
The 2004 meeting took place just after the entry into
force of the IT treaty.  Participants agreed that the ongoing
discussions about the treaty implementation offered the best
opportunity for research policy inputs.  An ‘African
Working Group on Genetic Resources’ was also proposed as
a way of developing coordinated policy positions among the
participating countries.  This working group did not mate-
rialize, although a parallel effort among African country
negotiators did. 
Distinct from the ICTSD/UNCTAD conference series,
the Meridian-managed series on PGRs emphasized the
problem of vertical policy integration—of connecting glob-
al policy initiatives not only to national policies, but also to
local and institutional practices.  This has unique impor-
tance in the agricultural research field, where even the poor-
est farmers are producers—not just users—of technological
innovations.  It was also a response to the perceived dangers
of an emerging culture of restrictive ownership, which
threatened to leap ahead of actual policies governing access.
The 2003 event tapped collective concern and uncertain-
    
ty among international actors about these disconnects.
The 2004 event took up the difficult and necessary task
of localizing those concerns, and specifying the national
and regional strategies appropriate to them.
The IP Program was built on the argument that the sub-
stantive problems of global IP policy were inseparable
from problems of process and participation.  The WTO
and WIPO were famously closed institutions, largely
unconcerned with transparency, diversity of inputs, or
legitimacy in the eyes of civil society groups.  Rockefeller
support for the Geneva NGOs was intended in part to
increase pressure on these organizations for greater open-
ness, transparency, and enhanced participation by ‘pro-
poor’ advocates and representatives. 
The ‘Call of the Earth’ initiative (www.earthcall.org)
shared these goals.  Call of the Earth was devoted to
improving the capacity of indigenous peoples to engage
in international IP policy debates on issues that affected
them.  The launch of the initiative at Bellagio in 2002
culminated a year of consultations with indigenous
groups and international organizations to determine the
appropriate form and focus of such an effort.  Although
the vulnerability of indigenous peoples to biopiracy and
other forms of appropriation had received increasing
attention by policy communities and by indigenous peo-
ples themselves, there was no institutional means of for-
mulating or voicing indigenous positions in global fora.
Call of the Earth was established to provide that struc-
ture.  
The initiative brought together a wide range of
indigenous leaders, researchers, and policy advocates to
explore the terrain of indigenous IP concerns and posi-
tions.  Although the initiative was housed at the United
Nations University’s Institute of Advanced Studies in
Japan, it acted primarily as a virtual network linking a
geographically dispersed membership.  Bellagio meetings
in 2002 and 2003 were the principal occasions for face-
to-face meetings.  The second of these was followed by a
larger policy meeting in Como, Italy on the subject of
Access and Benefit-Sharing (ABS) around plant genetic
resources.
The challenge of building common positions from
diverse indigenous perspectives was apparent from the
earliest consultations.  Much of the early work of Call of
the Earth, consequently, was built around a research
agenda that could begin to distill and analyze indigenous
experiences with the ownership and control of knowl-
edge resources.  
Substantively, the primary areas of concern closely
tracked broader policy conversations about access to
genetic resources: the challenges of inventorying genetic
resources as a way of clarifying ownership claims; prob-
lems of biopiracy and other forms of misappropriation
by outside parties; the utility and prospects of ‘disclosure
of origins’ requirements as a basis for benefit-sharing
agreements; and—especially—strategies and guidelines
for effective benefit-sharing in contexts where the com-
mercialization of genetic resources could serve indige-
nous interests.  In contrast, the meetings dealt much less
frequently with the cultural dimensions of traditional
knowledge, such as questions of cultural heritage and the
traditional arts.
In 2002 and 2003, access and benefit sharing domi-
nated the substantive discussions, in part reflecting the
timing of upcoming meetings of the CBD Working
Group on those issues.  Since its adoption in 1993, the
CBD process had focused much of its attention on flesh-
ing out its central principle of “fair and equitable sharing
of the benefits arising out of the utilization of genetic
resources.”  In 2003, this work focused on the recently
passed ‘Bonn Guidelines,’ which provided detailed guid-
ance for how benefit sharing agreements were to be
negotiated.  Engaging the CBD process was attractive in
part because it was much more receptive to indigenous
participation than WIPO and the WTO.  The research
papers from the 2003 meeting were submitted to the
Working Group as part of its call for research inputs.
Organizationally, the initiative proved much more
complicated than originally anticipated.  Underlying the
challenge of finding common policy positions were
broader disagreements about the utility of engaging the
compromise-driven, forum-based advocacy that the
WTO and WIPO processes, especially, required.
Opposition to the patenting of life forms, for example,
made the give and take of policy negotiation unappeal-
ing to many participants.  Related tensions about the
governance structure of the group proved to be another
area of difficulty.    
For IP Program staff, the Call of the Earth initiative
was conceived as one half of a two part initiative on
indigenous rights.  The original plan envisioned the cre-
ation of a complementary legal defense fund that would
take up cases of misappropriation of indigenous knowl-
edge.  Given the unresolved difficulties of the Call of the
Earth process, this project was never pursued.  The
Foundation did, however, make a modest investment to
help launch the Public Interest Intellectual Property
Advocates, a network of IP legal experts that provides
pro bono legal assistance on IP issues to public-interest
TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE
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Like the issue of access to genetic resources, access to
medicines and the financing and organization of health-
related research and development were core concerns of
the Bellagio series.   This attention was driven in large
part, at the outset, by the opportunity to shape the debate
about TRIPS flexibilities and compulsory licensing creat-
ed by the 2001 Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public
Health (the Medicines Decision).  The declaration speci-
fied the right of countries to prioritize public health with-
in the TRIPS framework—affirming the right of, e.g.,
Brazil or India to issue compulsory licenses for the local
production and use of patented medicines.  This was not
a hypothetical freedom.  The threat of compulsory licens-
ing had been a foundation of the Brazilian public health
campaign against AIDS since the late 1990s, where it
resulted in dramatically lowered prices for anti-retroviral
drugs.  To this day, Brazil manages the only effective
large-scale HIV/AIDS treatment program in the develop-
ing world.   
The main difficulty—widely recognized at the time—
was that the declaration provided no means for countries
that lacked pharmaceutical manufacturing capacities to
exercise that right.  The 2003 Medicines Decision sought
to resolve this problem by specifying a process through
which poor countries could import patented medicines as
generics from foreign producers.  Many health advocates
saw this as an empty victory: the specified mechanism
was cumbersome and, many believed, unworkable.  These
concerns have kept access to medicines and compulsory
licensing on the TRIPS front burner despite the formal
amendment of TRIPs to include the Medicines Decision
at the 2005 WTO Ministerial meeting in Hong Kong. 
CPTech and other Rockefeller grantees played impor-
tant roles in the original Doha negotiations.  The need
for continued efforts to exploit the Doha opening was
clear to many of the principals in that debate, and formed
an important part of early Bellagio series planning.
ICTSD/UNCTAD’s ‘Agenda-setting’ meetings took up
the subject of compulsory licensing and other TRIPS
flexibilities on several occasions in 2002 and 2003.  In
the wake of the Medicines Decision, and in anticipation
of the 2005 entry-into-force of TRIPS pharmaceutical
patent requirements for India (a major supplier of generic
versions of patented medicines), Rockefeller staff,
ICTSD, and UNCTAD organized a more focused explo-
ration of this ‘regulatory toolbox.’
The 2004 ‘Dialogue on Ensuring Policy Options for
Affordable Access to Essential Medicines,’ was part of a
conscious effort by the IP Team to bring together
grantees that had been working on IP management at the
institutional level, often in collaboration with the private
sector, with those grantees focused on global IP debates
that often brought them into conflict with the private
sector.  It was also, in part, an effort to bridge some of
the differences in approach that had emerged within the
Foundation and between Foundation grantees early on in
the design of the IP program.  The Dialogue took up four
distinct strategies for improving access to medicines:
• The role and effectiveness of Public-Private
Partnerships (PPPs) in addressing neglected diseases.
These took many different forms, ranging from part-
nerships focused on product development and the
financing of innovation, to those concerned with
access to medicines and strengthening national health
systems.  Participants from MIHR and other
Rockefeller-sponsored efforts played a large role in
this conversation.
• The effective use of compulsory licensing, especial-
ly in the context of the Medicines Decision.  Much
of the discussion focused on strategies for strengthen-
ing the capacities of developing countries to identify
and respond to anti-competitive pricing.  Simplified,
standardized compulsory licensing procedures offered
one possible answer.  Coordinated regional initiatives
were another.  Both held some promise of increasing
the options and leverage available to countries with
nominal manufacturing capacity and limited IP
expertise.  
• Promoting local drug manufacturing capacities.
The lack of manufacturing capacity in many coun-
tries was the major bar to effective compulsory licens-
ing.  The Medicines Decision was cumbersome in
part because it forced licensing solutions out of the
area of national policy and into the more complicated
setting of bilateral and multilateral trade.  Expanding
manufacturing capacities was viewed by many partici-
pants as a necessary though by no means adequate
response to the compulsory licensing problem, and
more generally to pharmaceutical industry consolida-
tion and the upcoming 2005 TRIPS requirements on
pharmaceutical patents.  
Looking ahead, the group identified a major research
role in informing the ‘make or buy’ decision con-
fronting many developing countries, both in the
short and medium term.  It seemed likely that certain
HEALTH
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manufacturing countries would play larger roles in
generic drug production—especially those currently
outside the TRIPS agreement (China, Cuba) and
the handful of pharmaceutical manufacturing, least-
developed countries who benefit from an additional
decade of TRIPS exemptions (e.g., Bangladesh).  
• Competition policy. Compulsory licenses can be
used as tools for combating monopoly pricing in
markets, and are therefore tools of competition poli-
cy as well as IP policy.  Seeing access to medicines in
terms of competition policy clarified certain chal-
lenges associated with market provision and intro-
duced policy opportunities that went beyond the
compulsory licensing framework.  It highlighted
non-IP based obstacles to access, such as the issue of
data exclusivity.  It brought the question of alterna-
tive models of financing medical research and devel-
opment into sharper focus (leading to the proposed
Research and Development Treaty).  And it opened
the door to a broader reframing of the access debate
as a consumer’s issue with a stronger global con-
stituency.
The final sessions of the Dialogue meeting highlight-
ed the strategic differences—frequent at Bellagio—
between those focused on exploiting existing treaty and
policy frameworks, especially TRIPS, and those who saw
greater potential in alternative strategies for financing
and managing innovation.  Several Bellagio meetings
were devoted specifically to exploring the latter set of
possibilities.  By necessity, these were cross-thematic
conversations that sought to connect developments in
different fields of innovation—software development,
open access publishing, and genomic research among
them.  For much of the series, however, the center of
gravity for this conversation remained the financing of
health-related research and development.
This exploration of alternatives began with a 2002 meet-
ing on the ‘Collective Management of Intellectual
Property: Tackling the Anti-Commons.’   It continued
through the 2003 exploratory meeting on the Research
and Development Treaty and played a role in the 2004
meeting on ‘Preserving Public Goods in Health,
Education, and Learning.’  It concluded in 2005 with a
conference on ‘Open Source Models of Innovation in
the Life Sciences.’  
In 2002, this was conceptually ambitious and for-
ward-looking work.  By 2005, developments in both
global policy and institutional practices had begun to
catch up—led in part by participants from the 2002
meeting.   The potential for larger shifts in the financing
and organizational practice of innovation had begun to
materialize.
The 2002 conversation brought together a cross-dis-
ciplinary group to explore models of collective manage-
ment of IP, ranging from the ‘commons-based’ manage-
ment of resources, to open source models of software
production, to patent pools and other cross-licensing
arrangements.  This broader consultation was designed
to inform Rockefeller efforts to resolve a number of
patent thickets or ‘anti-commons’ identified in the
health area, including several that blocked progress on
HIV/AIDS diagnostics and treatments.  The Foundation
was especially interested in the prospects of a ‘technolo-
gy trust’ that could combine several patent pooling ini-
tiatives, and provide a model for freeing research and
development from reliance on highly-encumbered tech-
nologies, such as exclusive patents on disease-signaling
genes.
The meeting was rich in spin-off activities and collab-
orations, some of which became core Rockefeller IP
Program investments, while others took root in other
institutions and policy settings.   Plans for a technology
trust were not pursued by the Foundation, but have
gained traction through subsequent efforts at Duke
University, where they have attracted interest from the
National Human Genome Research Institute.  The
Tropical Diseases Initiative—targeting malaria, tubercu-
losis, Dengue fever and other chronically neglected dis-
eases—was launched in 2004 to test the potential of
open source models of drug research in areas known for
persistent market failure.  The meeting also informed
CAMBIA’s open source biotechnology licensing project,
BiOS, by connecting its work on enabling technologies
in plant genetic research to other practices and practi-
tioners in the information and life sciences.  By 2005,
BiOS had become a significant strategic investment of
the IP program. 
The most direct outcome of the 2002 meeting was
the 2003 Bellagio conference on “A New Trade
Framework for Supporting Health Research and
Development,” organized by CPTech.  The meeting
looked specifically at the limitations of a global IP sys-
tem designed to fund research through high drug prices.
It was the first step in debating and ultimately outlining
20
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an alternative global framework for financing healthcare
research and development.  The meeting explored sever-
al variants on this theme which ultimately coalesced into
‘small’ and ‘big’ proposals.   The more ambitious plan
envisioned a global treaty that would establish minimum
national obligations for investment in health R&D.
These, in turn, could be met through any system of
financing.  This conversation led to a series of follow-on
meetings sponsored by Rockefeller and others in the
course of 2004, which resulted in the drafting of the
Research and Development Treaty.  The principles of the
treaty were adopted by the World Health Organization
Innovating Around IP
Bellagio meetings explored a range of strategies for ‘de-
linking’ innovation from the exercise of exclusive rights
over knowledge. Collectively, these discussions con-
tributed to the development of ‘access to knowledge’ as
a positive goal that went beyond defensive actions and
carefully defined exemptions to private ownership. By
2005, the basic question was not the viability of alterna-
tives to high IPRs, but rather their translatability into
new fields such as pharmaceutical development. In addi-
tion to the Research and Development Treaty described
earlier, Bellagio conversations focused on:
• Open Source Collaboration. Open source usually
describes large-scale, voluntaristic collaborations
among software programmers or researchers, oper-
ating under a licensing framework that permits
unrestricted use of a common stock of code or
other technology. Stricter open source licensing
models add the condition that any innovation
derived from work under the license must also be
released under that license. This ‘viral’ clause distin-
guishes the General Public License (GPL) used by
the Free Software movement and other groups.
Several public-sector biotechnology initiatives have
been organized under open source principles in
order to ensure that knowledge produced through
them remains accessible. CAMBIA’s BiOS initiative,
launched in 2004, is an effort to generalize this prac-
tice in the life sciences, with special attention to cir-
cumventing IP-encumbered research technologies.
CAMBIA’s early efforts focus on developing an alter-
native to the patented use of agrobacterium as a
technology for gene transfer between plants.
• Patent pooling is the practice of aggregating IP held
by firms in areas where the contested or fragment-
ed ownership of key technologies blocks the devel-
opment of new technologies and markets. Shared
royalties often provide the incentive structure for
participation. In the US, patent pools were created
for aircraft technologies during WWI and later for
radio technologies. Today, they are used in a number
of areas where collective action is required to facili-
tate markets for new products. The World Health
Organization has worked to create a patent pool for
SARS research. An HIV/AIDS patent pool has been
discussed for several years, without significant
progress.
• Prizes for medical innovation have attracted growing
attention as a way of focusing research on unprof-
itable health problems—including but not limited to
the ‘neglected diseases’ prevalent in poor countries.
There is a variety of existing and proposed prize
models, from conventionally-structured prizes to the
‘Medical Innovation Prize Fund’ developed by
CPTech and proposed in a bill in the US House of
Representatives in 2005. The latter envisions a shift
in the larger system of research incentives from a
purely market-driven approach to one based on
compensating investments after the fact, based on
demonstrated health benefits. The CPTech model
would create a pool of money to reward investment
equal to the amount spent on medical R&D in the
U.S. Money would be allocated through an invest-
ment mechanism managed by insurers and other
intermediaries. The system would provide a rev-
enue-neutral deal for pharmaceutical companies in
exchange for the elimination of market exclusivity
on prescription drugs.
• Compensatory liability offers an alternative to intel-
lectual property rights for fostering certain kinds of
‘downstream’ use of innovations. The practice of
exclusive licensing of IP would be replaced with a
liability regime that required users of proprietary
technologies to pay a royalty when they profit from
that use. The benefits of such a system would
include lower transactions costs and less risk to
downstream users, for whom the use of new tech-
nologies is often costly and risky. The liability model
is associated primarily with the work of Jerome
Reichman, one of the core Bellagio participants.
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in May 2006. 
The Research and Development Treaty, patent pool-
ing, and other collective strategies for health R&D were
on the agenda again in 2004, in the context of a wide-
ranging meeting on ‘Preserving Public Goods in Health,
Education, and Learning.’  While centrally concerned
with the issue of data exclusivity and with the prospects
of the treaty draft, the meeting also explored the contin-
uing difficulty of marshalling sufficient incentives and
political will for a patent-pool approach to major dis-
eases.  
A final Bellagio meeting in 2005 pulled together the
diverse strands of work on alternative licensing schema
in the context of growing interest in Open Source mod-
els of innovation in the life sciences.  The meeting
brought together representatives of several Rockefeller-
sponsored institutions, PIPRA, IAVI, CAMBIA,
CPTech, and other longstanding partners in the Bellagio
process.  Where in 2002 the prospect of using open
source techniques and licensing beyond its initial appli-
cation in software had been mostly conjectural, by 2005
it was an increasingly practical strategy with growing
policy implications.  Open source models of collabora-
tive production and shared licensing had begun to find
traction in a number of biotechnology fields, where the
proprietary ownership of genetic knowledge and of
enabling research technologies remained poorly defined
and frequently contested.  The emergence of CAMBIA’s
BiOS licensing system for plant genetic technologies, in
particular, signaled a convergence of conversations
between the life and information sciences.  It also sig-
naled a growing need to better understand the specific
meaning and conditions of success of open source in a
context in which ‘open’ practices were fast proliferating.
What does open source signify in the life sciences?
What are its conditions of success or failure?  What does
the effort to reconstruct a ‘protected commons’ through
open source licensing share with other licensing efforts,
such as the public-private partnerships and humanitari-
an licensing strategies promoted by IAVI and the Gates
Foundation, or the restricted commercial licensing mod-
els favored by PIPRA? How does open source relate to
publicly-funded, large-scale collaborations, such as
CGIAR’s ‘Harvest Plus’ initiative on research into staple
food crops, or the HapMap project on the human
genome?   What is the relationship between open source
as a practical solution to certain kinds of research prob-
lems and open source as a larger framework for innova-
tion?  The conference did not provide definitive answers,
but did bring into contact many of the actors who will
provide them in the next years.  
The successes and limitations of the Bellagio series were
tied to those of the Rockefeller IP program and—at
greater remove—to the research and advocacy move-
ment it helped foster.  This mutuality was the result of
careful planning and constantly-renewed effort by the
Foundation’s IP program staff.  Staff developed the
broader trajectories of the series and organized many of
the meetings. They also managed the complex delega-
tion of responsibilities to ICTSD, the Meridian
Institute, Call of the Earth, and other partner organiza-
tions.  These partnerships were the key to extending the
scope and scale of the series, and to ensuring its integra-
tion into different communities of practice.  The com-
munities, in turn, made the series their own as they used
it to learn, expand their networks, and develop new
projects.  Less quantifiable but no less important for
some participants was the halo effect of the Foundation’s
interest in their work.  In some fields, the series lent the
Foundation’s reputation to emerging projects and critical
positions.  For policy actors and practitioners seeking
traction against a dominant IP discourse, this legitima-
tion of their work had real value.
The mission and organizational structure of the series
were also connected to a vision of how to use the new
Frati center.   Bellagio’s proximity to Geneva made it an
ideal location for engaging policy actors and policy
processes at WIPO, the WTO, and other UN organiza-
tions.  The Geneva NGOs were able to participate more
consistently than other Bellagio partners, and better
mobilize actors with less direct investments in IP policy
reform. This continuity was more difficult to maintain
among communities separated by greater geographical
distance.  As the original plan for closely-sequenced
meetings ran up against participant time constraints,
Bellagio’s greater accessibility to Geneva-based groups
created a positive feedback loop that strengthened the
focus on global policy.
As the final meetings made clear, many of the con-
cerns that shaped the series in 2002 were still pressing in
2005.  The dramatic increase in pro-development IP
advocacy had produced only modest shifts in the inter-
pretation of TRIPS.  TRIPS+ provisions continued to
proliferate through bilateral and regional agreements.
‘Neglected’ diseases were still neglected relative to rich-
country health needs.  Policies regarding access to genet-
ic resources were still subjects of dispute and confusion.
What had changed, by 2005, was the emergence of
real debate over the shape and forms of inclusion in the
BELLAGIO IN RETROSPECT
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global information society—and widespread recognition
of the role that intellectual property policy plays in that
debate.  Developing countries are now much more
assertive and better prepared in defending their rights,
both through defensive actions to preserve their margins
of policy maneuver, and through new policy proposals
that define an increasingly coherent and comprehensive
pro-development IP agenda.  Public-sector IP manage-
ment has become more sophisticated, and open source
and other strategies have begun to hint at more radical
shifts in the organization of innovation and knowledge
flows. 
These developments were among the original criteria
for success for the IP program.  As an early entrant into
these debates, the Rockefeller Foundation assumed the
risks of building a critical policy discourse and commu-
nity.  Not all of its efforts succeeded, and much of the
work is incomplete: the defensive struggle will require
continued investment; the ‘Development Agenda’ and
‘Research and Development Treaty’ are only frameworks
at present; and IP management strategies developed by
PIPRA to CAMBIA have only begun to be tested.  The
most speculative projects of 2002 are only now finding
their footing.  One important sign of success, however,
is that the Rockefeller Foundation now has company in
this space.  The Bellagio meetings fostered not only a
stronger community of researchers, advocates, and prac-
titioners, but also of donors who have built on and
extended the Bellagio work.  
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